Social inequality, mobility, and the illegitimate inheritance of status: recruitment and career patterns of GDR business elites by Salheiser, Axel
www.ssoar.info
Social inequality, mobility, and the illegitimate
inheritance of status: recruitment and career
patterns of GDR business elites
Salheiser, Axel
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Salheiser, A. (2010). Social inequality, mobility, and the illegitimate inheritance of status: recruitment and
career patterns of GDR business elites. Historical Social Research, 35(3), 117-133. https://doi.org/10.12759/
hsr.35.2010.3.117-133
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-310711
Historical Social Research, Vol. 35 — 2010 — No. 3, 117-133 
Social Inequality, Mobility, and the Illegitimate 
Inheritance of Status: Recruitment and Career 
Patterns of GDR Business Elites 
Axel Salheiser  
Abstract: »Soziale Ungleichheit, Mobilität und illegitime Statusvererbung: 
Die Rekrutierungs- und Karrieremuster von DDR-Wirtschaftseliten«. Func-
tional elites of the GDR, the so-called cadres, formed a rather large and inho-
mogeneous stratum of the socialist society. Empirical evidence based on quan-
titative analyses of large prosopographical and biographical datasets unveils 
paradoxical patterns of social inequality underlying the processes of recruit-
ment and career mobility of cadres. Hereditary aspects had a greater impact on 
the allocation of social status than expected and thwarted the socialist project. 
Not only did a New Class or “socialist intelligentsia” emerge, increasing social 
closure also reverberated a distinguishably “bourgeois” tradition. In the 1980s, 
workers and cooperative farmers belonged to the most disadvantaged social 
strata in the “Workers’ and Peasants’ State”. While this could be observed for 
different sectors of the GDR society, economy in particular gave an instructive 
example. Factories and large industrial combines (Kombinate) were led by 
businessmen who often did not even have a documented worker’s origin. In-
stead, and in the first place, they boasted required aspects of high cultural capi-
tal, such as academic and special vocational training, and were politically reli-
able with regard to SED state party alignment and honorary functions. Thus, 
even the descendents of “capitalist” entrepreneurs, persons with a National So-
cialist family background or persons with a personal NS past had fairly good 
prospects to embark on careers in the GDR economy. The paper briefly dis-
cusses statistical analyses of data on higher executive personnel such as direc-
tor generals (CEOs), branch directors, and heads of department. 
Keywords: social inequality, mobility, GDR, cadres, economy, recruitment, 
careers, inheritance of status. 
1. Introduction: East German Socialist Managers 
Managers in the GDR (Industriekader), and, first of all, the directors of cen-
trally-led industrial combines (which roughly translates to CEOs in capitalist 
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corporations) were state functionaries appointed by the Communist Party 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED). Thus, they had to be con-
sidered exponents of the East German socialist regime. But unlike Party secre-
taries who were solely bound to party loyalty and could rely on the power 
apparatus in the first place, the management cadres represented a social type 
that was genuinely determined by its ambiguous institutional embeddedness 
between production, markets and Marxism. The processing industry of the 
GDR was extremely centralized, well-developed and required well-trained 
leadership. Executing the production plan (which was a law by definition), 
coping with economic shortage and acting according to socialist moral princi-
ples at the same time was always a balancing act. 
In this contribution, the social backgrounds, the socio-political family mi-
lieus, the professional training, and the party affiliation of industrial cadres are 
addressed. Also, the terms and conditions under which cadres were granted 
entrance to the echelons of upper management are examined. The analyses 
presented below are based on the Central Cadre Database CCDB (Zentraler 
Kaderdatenspeicher, ZKDS) of the Council of Ministers (Ministerrat) of the 
GDR. (For an in-depth analysis of cadre recruitment and careers in the GDR 
industry, along with a detailed discussion of important literature on the subject, 
cf. Salheiser 2009a. Salheiser 2009b offers another summery on top-level in-
dustry cadres.) 
2. Main Criteria of Cadre Recruitment and Advancement 
In order to embark on a cadre career, three sets of requirements had to be met: 
(1) political loyalty and commitment, or party alignment, (2) professionalism, 
or qualification, and (3) a cluster of social traits and assets whose most striking 
one was class background (Fig. 1). 
They open a feature space in which political power structure, functional as-
pects of the societal subsystem (here: economy), and social structure are the 
three main dimensions. In past studies based on the CCDB, the impact of these 
dimensions of social differentiation could be repeatedly verified in Correspon-
dence Analyses, amongst other statistical methods (cf. Best 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2009). 
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Fig. 1: Legitimacy vs. Pragmatism: Main Criteria of 
Cadre Recruitment and Careers 
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Essential for my interpretation are the different degrees of freedom each di-
mension offers in order to maintain the functional capability and efficiency of a 
modern economy. While Communist Party membership and a particular class 
origin would be dispensable criteria under non-authoritarian circumstances, 
professionalism is clearly not. The legitimacy of the cadre hierarchy was fueled 
by the ideology of a society of workers led by workers, but to some extent this 
proved incompatible with structural restraints and practical necessities.  
Following Stalin’s observation of the importance of cadres in general, lead-
ing personnel for the industry was meticulously prepared, selected, guided, and 
educated (Fig. 2). GDR careers were highly consistent and, with the ubiquity of 
some career episodes, reflected the societal claim of creating a homo socialisti-
cus. Cadre staff managers (Kaderleiter) sat at the levers of social engineering. 
The Communist Party’s interest and care for family background was deeply 
rooted in sociological thought and had been ignited by the teachings of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin. Engels had identified the family as the germ cell 
(Keimzelle) of society, and the theoretical concept of social mobility and the 
phenomenon of self-reproduction through family inheritance were introduced 
by Russian “bourgeois” sociologist Pitirim Sorokin as early as in 1926 (cf. 
Engels 1987, Sorokin 1926). In the communist understanding, capitalist class 
society threatened to come back in through the backdoor of the family. And as 
far as empirical evidence shows, one is inclined to support this thesis. Consis-
tently, East German postwar socialism took a cybernetic approach of shaping 
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social structure by systematically diminishing the influence of the family on the 
allocation of status. 
Fig. 2: Episodes of a Cadre Biography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Social Background and Social Mobility 
However, while early GDR social policy had fostered the advancement of 
lower-class citizens and forced the old elite into strategic withdrawal, or niche 
positions, the government later refrained from serious counter-privileging (cf. 
Miethe 2007a, 2007b) and, quite contrary, even tried to stimulate meritocratic 
elements of societal (re-)differentiation. In the last two decades of “real exist-
ing socialism”, the extent of social inequality, for example in the education 
system of the GDR, surmounted social inequality in many other socialist socie-
ties and even some Western capitalist countries. Intergenerational mobility 
dropped to a minimum: A university graduate with a working-class background 
became a rare exception, while managers and physicians would as a matter of 
course send their offspring to secondary schools qualifying for university ad-
mission (Erweiterte Oberschulen). A worker’s son or daughter could still hope 
to become a well-trained engineer, but the position as director of a “people-
owned” company was more likely to be staffed with someone from an entre-
preneur’s family, a white-collar family, or from the intelligentsia (Fig. 3). 
Because fewer and fewer candidates met the complete troika of require-
ments – working-class background, party alignment, and professional training, 
and even less would urge to fill a cadre position at all, compromises had to be 
made. The legitimacy of the cadre system had been eroded by elite interests 
since long, and the government eventually embraced a pragmatism based on 
functional demand (even though the propaganda of equality trumpeted on). Not 
without subtle irony, Party functionaries were considered ‘honorary workers’, 
and a considerable share of candidates simply lied about their bourgeois fa-
ther’s or mother’s occupation, i.e., they forged their record on social back-
ground in order to clean this spot of bother. As shown with the social back-
grounds of 124 Combine Directors from various birth cohorts, anti-elitist 
principles of recruitment had been gradually discarded. The historical devel-
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opment clearly pointed towards social closure, the (neo)-bourgeoisie recap-
tured social influence. 
Fig. 3: Social Background of Combine Directors and the Tendency of Self-
Reproduction of Elite  
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4. Running in the Family? Socio-Political Milieu 
Background and the Legacy of the NS Past 
Being the functional elite of industry and mostly academically trained, socialist 
managers could also be described as a part of the technical-scientific intelli-
gentsia. However, their self-image as technocratic practitioners and specialists 
collided with their factual relation to and dependence on the regime. 
This refers to an all-German tradition: While the relationship between intel-
lectuals and power is often depicted as conflict i.e., in the context of dissent 
and resistance, the larger part of the German “educated bourgeoisie” 
(Bildungsbürgertum) indeed has a fateful history of entanglement in the web of 
ideologies and political power. 
Despite the pronounced opposition to the National Socialist German past (as 
well as contrary political means, ends, and ideological contents), the GDR 
dictatorship wrote a historical palimpsest of a society under authoritarian rule 
wherein elite action was ideologically biased and elites gained a considerable 
part of their legitimacy from arrangements with the political leadership. 
Ironically, the continuity of ideologization of society was the promise of 
(intergenerational) status continuity for privileged social classes which the 
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Socialist regime rather intended to disestablish. In its early years, the GDR 
strongly depended on the well-trained and experienced, even if those were 
morally compromised and tainted by “shadows of the past” (cf. Best / Salheiser 
2006). As thoroughly new elites were yet to be produced, the young socialist 
society could not be built without integrating the old bourgeois strata and their 
descendents. An anti-fascist social renewal and the proclaimed scientific-
economic progress quickly proved incompatible. Thus, status-oriented indi-
viduals and families were offered “strategies of survival” under the new Com-
munist rule by adapting to it with overt gestures of alignment, even if they 
would not embrace it quickly or wholeheartedly. Opportunism and ostentatious 
loyalty were favored above a spotless family registry. A present SED member-
ship soon became a more important career asset than anything else. 
The National Socialist background of GDR elites has recently been revived 
as a field of scholarly interest by exploring new sources and applying methods 
of empirical social research (cf. Best/Meentzen 2010, Remy 2010, and their 
respective articles in this volume). In this chapter, I shall take a broader per-
spective and discuss the political memberships of socialist managers, their 
parents and families before and after 1945. 
Starting with the political background of socialist managers in the family 
perspective, remarkable hierarchy level and cohort differences become visible 
(Fig. 4). While for the vast majority of parents no party membership had been 
registered at all, there was a significant difference between the percentage of 
party-affiliated parents of cadres and non-cadres. The higher a cadre in the 
hierarchy, the more probable was a parent with a party membership. Basically, 
this holds true for NSDAP and left-wing working-class parties (or post-war 
East German CP, respectively) the like. NSDAP memberships of parents of 
course underlies a cohort effect with the generation of cadres born in the 1930s 
and early 1940s, but this cannot explain away the different shares of milieu 
backgrounds between cadres from different hierarchy levels. Even among the 
same age cohorts, cadres who had parents without a party affiliation were more 
common on lower levels than on higher levels. The higher the hierarchy level, 
the higher was the share of cadres whose fathers were (or had been) SED 
members. Among parents who belonged to the intelligentsia or white collar 
professions, party affiliation in general and former NSDAP membership in 
particular (in the respective age cohorts), was far more frequent than among 
other parents.1 Most of these parents held no other party membership after the 
war; their historical political experience might have been saturated. 
                                                             
1  The fathers of cadres from entrepreneur families or the milieu of free professionals had also 
frequently been NSDAP members. Of course it has to be remembered that Social Democrat 
and Communist Party had been illegal between 1933 and 1945. Thus, registered member-
ships were rather rare. In the CCDB, memberships in foreign workers’ parties – such as the 
CPSU – were also monitored, but they were even rarer. 
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Fig. 4: Socio-Political Family Milieus, NS and CP Affiliations of Parents 
Socio-political family background (%)
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ment
Resistance fighter 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.4 0.1 0.1
Until 1945 Workers Party(CP, SPD) 3.8 2.5 4.6 12.9 7.4 6.3 4.2
From 1945 Workers Party 17.5 20.7 15.6 11.3 18.0 14.4 14.6
East German Party (except
SED) = „National Front“ parties 2.6 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.6
Father NSDAP 3.7 1.6 4.9 15.3 7.9 8.2 3.6
Father member of NS org. 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3
Fascist org. - now SED 1.4 1.0 1.7 4.8 1.8 1.8 1.4
Fascist org. - now other party 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.5
No party 70.3 71.6 69.6 50.8 61.2 65.0 72.7
Father: Until 1945
NSDAP (%)
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Lower employees 2.3
Cadres 7.9
Combine Director 21.8
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What held true for the political family background was even more valid with 
regard to the cadres’ own past: the Party could forgive, but it did not forget.2  
Even 44 years after the war, CCDB still contained variables on former Nazi 
memberships, indicating a sustained relevance.3 There is empirical evidence 
(cf. Best / Salheiser 2006) that, apparently, there was no substantial need for 
socialist cadres to “balance” a National Socialist burden by excessive efforts of 
formal loyalty such as SED functions, honorary memberships in mass organi-
zations, or by a formal qualification level above average. As it seems, former 
National Socialists integrated rather unsuspiciously. But we have reason to 
                                                             
2  On general problems of the abuse of anti-fascism and SED’s calculated relation to former 
NSDAP members, also cf. Ross 2000, Leo / Reif-Spirek 2001, Joseph 2002, Ahbe 2007, 
Hirschinger 2007, among others. 
3  As usual in the GDR, and for the obvious propagandistic reasons, the original coding book 
of the CCDB avoids the terms “National Socialism” and “National Socialist” and uses the 
terms “fascism” and “fascist” instead. The CCDB holds records on former memberships in 
NSDAP, SA, SS, NSKK, NS Lawyers League (NS-Rechtswahrerbund), as well as full-time 
Hitler Youth functions. Remarkably, the categories distinguish between General (Allge-
meiner) SS and Waffen-SS. Furthermore, there are categories like “fascist Wehrmacht“, Or-
ganisation Todt and Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD). Grotesque enough, records on former 
memberships in (pre-1933) Reichswehr, in West German Bundeswehr (!) and even in 
French Foreign Legion (Fremdenlegion) belong to the same variable. 
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believe that a cadre file entry on the NS past – as a “moral mortgage” – could 
be used by cadre staff offices as a kind of reminder – or as an insurance.4 
Especially East German economy depended on the reintegration of old elites 
and former NS followers (cf. Müller 2004: 221, Müller 1962: 55, Welsh 
1991).5 A functioning economy was far more important than the protest of 
rigorous and idealistic communists (cf. Leide 2005) and a lot of former NS 
followers avidly agreed on that notion and took their chances (cf. Karutz 2003, 
Kuhlemann 2004). 
Of course, being given that “second chance” did not only result in gratitude 
per se, but in the obligation to gratitude – or that particular type of a mutual 
agreement of silence that is the first step to blackmail. Even in the 1970s and 
1980s, a well documented NS past could still be like the sword of Damocles 
above a cadre’s head. If there had been any reason to get rid of him or her, the 
Party or the superior managers would have been given a perfect pretext. And 
only a few colleagues would have dared to oppose such an act of “anti-fascist 
purging”, no matter how late and how weak the accusations. Examples are 
provided by the important manufacturer of optical and electronic equipment, 
Carl Zeiss Jena, where cadres were ousted from office in 1976 because (?!) 
they had been NSDAP and NSKK6 members.7 In the dossier that led to their 
removal, someone had made the comforting remark that there was “no concen-
tration” as those two persons (“7 %”) did not work in the same department. 
However, the Combine Director, Wolfgang Biermann, demanded to “change 
cadres!”8 On the contrary, other Zeiss cadres could stay despite their former SA 
enlistment; those long-time Zeissianers were praised for their commitment 
“against inadequacies” and “for the cause of the working class”.9 As statistics 
prove, the Jena cases were no exceptions in GDR’s industry. 
                                                             
4  In the Federal Archives, documents of the cadre staff departments (Abteilungen für Kader 
und Bildung) of the ten (!) Ministries of Industry of the GDR are preserved. They show that 
statistics on former NS memberships were no longer produced on a regular basis in the 
1980s. With generational change, the issue had ceased to be a major aspect in central per-
sonnel planning and coordination. However, this does not mean that the records on the NS 
past were not used against the persons in question on the micro-level, i.e., by the cadre of-
fice staff or the superiors in their company or organization. 
5  Relatively high shares of NS elite continuity have been observed among managers and 
specialists in the field of high technology and industries that strongly depended on major 
investments and highly skilled and academically educated staffs such as Middle German 
chemistry (cf. Wagner-Kyora 2006) or optical industry and precision engineering (Carl 
Zeiss Jena, cf. Stutz 2006). 
6  Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps – the Nazi Motor Club. 
7  Archive source: Mitteilung der Inspektion des Generaldirektors an den Generaldirektor vom 
7. Januar 1976, UACZ Jena (Carl Zeiss Jena Company Archives), VA 02200, o. F. 
8  Translations mine. Ibid., also cf. Remy (2005: 59 f.). 
9  “Kaderpolitische Analyse des N-Bereichs des KCZ”, ohne Datum (1978), S. 5, UACZ Jena, 
VA 02200, o. F. 
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Among socialist managers born before 1928, former anti-fascist resistance 
fighters or NS victims were the absolute exception. Remarkably, there is a 
relatively high share of former NSDAP members among female cadres (Fig. 5). 
Fig. 5: Political Past and “Fascist” Entanglement 
Former membership of cadres born before 1928 (%) 
Cadres Exemplary cadre functions  CCDB 
industry 
sample 
Lower 
emplo-
yees 
total male female Combine.
Director 
Head 
division 
Comp.
Dir. 
Head 
Dept. 
CP 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,3 - - - 1,6 0,1 
Antifa 0,1 - 0,1 0,1 - - - - 0,1 
Registered 
NS victim 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,2 - - - 1,6 - 
NSDAP 3,1 1,7 3,7 3,6 5,7 -- 8,3 2,4 3,2 
Hitler 
Youth (HJ) 
leader 
0,9 0,1 1,2 1,3 - - 2,8 0,8 1,2 
Wehrmacht 43,8 28,2 50,0 52,6  85,7 52,8 54,0 47,7 
Waffen-SS 1,3 0,3 1,6 1,7  - - - 1,6 
Other NS 
org. incl. SA 
(General) SS 
etc. 
0,8 0,3 1,0 1,0 - - - 0,8 1,1 
 
In particular, the difference between cadres and lower employees is striking. 
The higher the hierarchy level, the higher the rate of former NSDAP members 
and full-time Hitler Youth functionaries. Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS service is 
presented for comparison: although combatant status clearly was the fate of a 
generation, a hierarchical effect can be noticed as well. In need of explanation, 
it has to be emphasized that age has been controlled for and that the result is 
robust. 10 
Only on the top level of Combine Directors, there is not a single entry for an 
NS entanglement. But it can be argued that it was common practice to refrain 
from feeding such explosive information on celebrity cadres into the CCDB. 
Generally, cadre statistics were not to be disclosed, and any “homemade” 
proofs of the National Socialist entanglement of cadres would have been a 
serious backlash for propaganda, especially as the GDR had already been at-
tacked in West German publications for tolerating former Nazis in its govern-
ment bodies (“Ehemalige Nationalsozialisten in Pankows Diensten”, cf. Unter-
suchungsausschuß Freiheitlicher Juristen 1960; also cf. Kappelt 1981).11 
                                                             
10  Of course, the disproportion of gender in the hierarchy levels has also been controlled for. 
11  Kappelt’s Braunbuch DDR can hardly be referred to as a differentiated study on the prob-
lem of former National Socialists in East Germany. It was designed as an answer to the 
Braunbücher (brown books) which had been published by the GDR propaganda machinery 
in order to attack West Germany and which partly contained counterfeit information, exag-
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Moreover, the disclosure of the NS past of leading cadres would have caused 
rumors among the lower employees and, thus, weakened the cadres’ authority 
in the companies.12 In fact, the share of former NSDAP members among Com-
bine Directors might have been similar to the share among Heads of Functional 
Divisions (Fachdirektoren) in the combines. The dark figure certainly was 
larger on the higher levels than on the lower levels of the hierarchy. It is also 
possible that the higher shares of cadres and the lower share of (shop-floor 
level) employees with a NS past are the results of coding practice. At least with 
regard to “ordinary” Wehrmacht service, the real shares might have been simi-
lar but only the information on the cadres was meticulously fed into the statis-
tics (shifting validity). 
However, I argue that there is another plausible explanation for the curious 
hierarchical effect. The entanglement of later top-level cadres had already been 
an indicator of their ambition, their flexibility, and their career orientation. In 
the Third Reich, they had simply put their trust in a totalitarian regime that had 
been doomed and eventually destroyed. Later, the authoritarian but peaceful 
GDR offered longitudinal stability and kept the promise to a youth seduced and 
betrayed. Only in rare exceptions the cadres were old Nazis or “Märzge-
fallene”, most of them had made the typical step from Hitler Youth to NSDAP 
as teenagers on the notorious April 20 celebrations (until 1944).13 Also, socio-
political family background had a certain impact.14 At any rate, an NS past was 
not a negative career factor that inevitably diminished or destroyed the pros-
pects of GDR industry cadres, but at the same time, malpractice in central and 
local cadre policy with regard to the NS burden cannot be denied.  
Generally speaking, there was no ‘kin liability’ (Sippenhaft) for persons 
from politically encumbered families in the GDR, neither was there a rigid 
exclusion of former NS followers from the economic elite stratum. While re-
spective socio-political backgrounds were painstakingly monitored, and basic 
mistrust might have played a role, an astonishingly high share of cadres on 
lower to medium hierarchy levels had been members in NS organizations, 
                                                                                                                                
gerations, and a lot of defamatory statements about politicians and other celebrities of the 
Federal Republic (cf. Herbst 2004: 91 f.). Consistently, Kappelt also exaggerates – e.g., he 
does not quite differentiate between 17 years old NSDAP members and SS Troops or per-
petrators of NS war crimes (Herbst 2004: 93 f.). On a side note: The preface to Kappelt’s 
Braunbuch was written by Otto von Habsburg. Later, Kappelt wrote his PhD thesis in soci-
ology on the denazification in the GDR (Kappelt 1997). 
12  For example in the case of Carl Zeiss’ Wolfgang Biermann himself. Biermann’s docu-
mented NSDAP membership (cf. Herbst et al. 1994: 39, Remy 2005: 59) might have been 
deliberately erased in the CCDB for ideological reasons. It was more or less unknown in 
Jena. 
13  Cf. Frei 2007, Herbst 2004: 96, Kreikamp 2007, Focus 2007, and Heinz Fehlauer’s contri-
bution to this volume. 
14  Typically, cadres with a former NSDAP, HJ or Wehrmacht membership also had a charac-
teristic NS family background. 
 127
especially if this share is compared to the low share of former anti-fascist activ-
ists or NS victims. One explanation of this disproportion is that members of the 
old intelligentsia were qualified and trained for leading positions in manufac-
turing departments and economic bureaucracy, while former Communist un-
derground activists and concentration camp prisoners often lacked formal 
qualification because they had early been excluded from educational institu-
tions of the Third Reich. Other disadvantages of former inmates were their bad 
health condition, or reduced expectancy of life. Former Nazis or not – foremost 
of all, from SED’s perspective, cadres had to prove their political loyalty to the 
socialist regime and its leaders. It is reasonable to think that some cadres felt a 
strong obligation to excel at this, although statistical analyses provide no spe-
cific evidence.  
5. Political Loyalty 
The SED absolutely insisted on political discipline because this was a corner-
stone of her authoritarian rule. All Combine Directors were long-time members 
of the Party, and many of them held honorary offices in local or regional party 
bodies and a variety of affiliated mass organizations. 
Typically, party alignment was consolidated and expressed by “Party Stud-
ies” (Fig. 6).; ideological indoctrination which usually took a pseudo-academic 
appeal at a certain position level and could even result in being awarded a PhD 
in “Marxism-Leninism” (also cf. Schmeitzner 2005). Ordinary GDR citizens 
had disrespectfully coined the term “red light therapy” (Rotlichtbestrahlung) 
for the mandatory basic courses, but for some cadres delegation to District 
Party School (Bezirksparteischule) was an honor. Combine Directors attended 
the top-level courses in Berlin, while the Heads of Functional Divisions or 
branches in the corporations (Fachdirektoren) often managed with less, at a 
medium level at local party schools. Without doubt, these “political qualifica-
tions” had a mostly symbolic value. Nevertheless, they could pay off as career 
assets one day. And if the Party favored opportunistic mindsets above legiti-
mate pedigrees, for some cadres a strong political commitment could balance 
the scales. 
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Fig. 6: SED (Communist) Party Schooling of Combine Directors (Large Corp. 
CEOs) in Centrally Led Industries of the GDR, n=124 
0 10 20 30 40 50
%
University Degree
Central Party Academy (PHS)
PHS - 1 year
Institute of Socialist Economy
District Party School (BPS)
County Party School (KPS)
Lower Party School - 3 months
none
 
6. Vocational Training and Professionalism 
There was neither substitute nor compensation for missing real qualification 
and good vocational and professional training (Fig. 7). Virtually all Combine 
Directors had majored in engineering or economics and graduated at least once 
at university level, or near-university level. Approximately one third of the 
Combine Directors held a PhD, mostly in Socialist Economics, and some even 
had been appointed honorary professors (Honorarprofessoren) at their local 
universities. The concentration of high academic certificates (and the symbolic 
capital bestowed with it) at the top of the hierarchy is a well-known pattern in 
West German (capitalist) management and refers back to traditional notions of 
the German educated bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürgertum). But it takes an ironic 
turn with the GDR, where the SED originally had promoted the idea of all 
citizens becoming Comrades, not embracing symbolic distinction. 
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Fig. 7: Highest Vocational Training / Educational Degrees 
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7. A Model of Cadre Advancement in Socialist Industry 
All in all, social background, political loyalty, and professionalism had an 
intriguing impact on the composition of upper management collectives, reveal-
ing paradoxical effects of social closure and an increasingly sclerotic status 
order. In confirmative statistical analyses, such as Binary Logistic Regression, 
the effects of these career determinants can be tested. For the sake of brevity, 
only a narrow selection of variables from a complex model of cadre recruit-
ment and advancement is discussed here (Fig. 8). CCDB provides data of 349 
Combine Directors and Deputy Combine Directors (who held a near-equivalent 
position in the hierarchy). Exp.(B) in the second column of the table specifies 
the ceteris paribus effects of the given variables as career factors, which means 
that the presence of a trait or achievement improved the statistical odds of 
advancement to the top by that factor. While Party membership, Party school-
ing, as well as the certificates of high academic training do have a considerable 
influence, social background hardly seems to matter at all. But this impression 
is deceiving because one has to take the variable categories into account which 
multiply in the equation. A working-class background was coded low, while 
white collar, intelligentsia, and all rather bourgeois backgrounds occupied the 
higher categories. Accordingly, cadres with blue-collared parents even had a 
significantly worse chance to reach top-level positions. This analysis is based 
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on full coverage of the GDR management elite, instead of a random sample, 
which no doubt supports the hypothesis that the disadvantage of workers in the 
“State of Workers and Peasants” (Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat) had become 
structural and systematic.  
Fig. 8: Advancement to the Top: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis 
Combine Directors (Large Corp. CEOs) and their Deputies 1 2 
Selected Career Determinants Exp(B) Sig. 
Sociodemographic 
1. Age in 1989 .978 .424n.s. 
2. Gender .315 .029* 
Social and Political 
3. Social background 1.171 .003** 
4.Wife: housewife 2.429 0.29* 
5. Number of children .924 .547n.s.6. 
6. SED (Communist Party) membership 9.541 .000*** 
7. Age when joining the SED 3 1.023 .578n.s. 
8. Number of memberships in mass organizations .853 .249n.s. 
9. Number of honorary functions 1.360 .000*** 
10. SED (Communist) Party schooling 4.521 .000*** 
11. Military service .542 .036* 
Professional 
12. Highest vocational training .744 .197n.s. 
13. Age when granted first university degree 3 .928 .028* 
14. University degree AND university of applied sciences degree 1.750 .029* 
15. University degree in Economics 1.497 .259n.s. 
16. PhD or equivalent 4.436 0.041* 
Symbolic   
17. Decorations (Value Sum Index) 1.005 .000*** 
Career Dynamics (from Optimal Matching of Career Sequences)   
18. Fast Career Advancement Type 1.279 0.048* 
1 NOC=349. Reference category: Heads of Departments (random sample, NOC=349) 
Pseudo-R^2: Cox & Snell 0.528, nagelkerke 0.703 2Incl. only persons born before 1945. 
3 Miss. cases automatically excl. from analysis. Age coefficients computed seperately for all 
cases 
8. Conclusion: Class Society Revived 
The findings discussed here illustrate once more the limitations of the socialist 
ideology and the cadre system with regard to the realism of its claims. Central 
societal planning and control is confined to the mere shaping of the institutional 
framework, but it cannot overrule the very foundations of social action, or 
human behavior, such as the tendency of status reproduction within families, 
and its ramifications for social structure in the long run. 
The communist government had tried to accelerate the wheel of societal 
“progress”, and seemed to succeed in doing so for a certain time, but then the 
wheel took an awkward leap and finally snapped back. Socialist cadres in the 
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GDR of the late 1980s were no longer the proletarian avant-garde they once 
supposed to be, they were a clearly elevated stratum in a petit-bourgeois soci-
ety. The class structure of the GDR had already sallied out to post-socialist 
shores. Destitute of imperative validity, the ideological tradition of egalitarian 
principles was no longer more than a self-deceit. 
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